Note: This is a research note supplementing the book Unscarcity, now available for purchase. These notes expand on concepts from the main text. Start here or get the book.
Emergency Protocol Design: The 90-Day Limit with 30-Day Cooling Period
How mathematical constraints can prevent emergencies from becoming permanent tyranny
The Best Way to Kill a Democracy
Here’s a counterintuitive fact: democracies almost never die from invasion. They commit suicide—and they almost always do it during an “emergency.”
On December 3, 2024, South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law at 10:30 PM, claiming “North Korean communist forces” had infiltrated the country. Armed soldiers surrounded the National Assembly. Political activities were banned. The press was placed under military control. It looked like democracy was over in Asia’s fourth-largest economy.
Except it wasn’t. 190 legislators climbed through windows and over barricades, convened an emergency session at 1:02 AM, and voted unanimously to lift martial law. By 4:30 AM, the coup had collapsed. Yoon was impeached within two weeks and is currently standing trial for insurrection. South Korean democracy survived because its institutions were strong enough—and fast enough—to reject the emergency.
Not every democracy gets so lucky.
The Pattern That Kills Democracies
Examine the corpses of dead democracies and you’ll find a suspicious pattern. Almost all of them died during a “temporary” crisis that somehow never ended.
According to research tracking 180 countries, states of emergency in 2020 alone matched the entire previous decade combined. Ninety-three countries invoked emergency powers during COVID-19’s first wave—equivalent to all emergencies declared globally since the 1980s. And here’s the punch line: the states most likely to declare emergencies weren’t autocracies (who don’t need excuses) or strong democracies (who have better tools). They were weak democracies—the ones most vulnerable to erosion.
The Pandemic Backsliding Index found that approximately 80% of all countries violated democratic standards during COVID-19. The most common violation? Lack of time limits on emergency measures. Emergency powers, once granted, tend to become permanent features of governance rather than temporary departures from it.
This isn’t bad luck. It’s bad math.
France’s 719-Day “Temporary” Emergency
When terrorists attacked the Bataclan theater in Paris on November 13, 2015, President François Hollande declared an immediate state of emergency. Under French law, this exceptional measure was supposed to last for 12 days.
It lasted 719 days—almost two years—through five consecutive extensions.
During those two years, authorities conducted over 4,300 raids without judicial oversight. They placed people under house arrest on the Interior Minister’s say-so. They restricted movement based on prefects’ decisions rather than court orders. The results? Less than 1% of home searches resulted in terrorism charges. According to the UN special rapporteur, “the French Muslim community is the one that has been mainly targeted by exceptional measures.”
Here’s where it gets worse. When the emergency finally ended in November 2017, France didn’t restore normal legal protections. Instead, Parliament passed the SILT Act—which made many emergency powers permanent parts of ordinary law. House arrests were renamed. Administrative searches became “home visits.” The emergency ended. The powers didn’t.
Ten years after the Paris attacks, France lives in what observers call a “permanent state of emergency.” New laws in 2021 (charity surveillance), 2022 (surveillance drones), and 2023 (algorithmic video monitoring) have steadily expanded the security state. In 2024, emergency measures were invoked in New Caledonia against indigenous Kanak protestors—not terrorists.
The temporary became eternal. The exception became the rule.
Switzerland’s Seven-Year Hangover
Even Switzerland—with its famous neutrality, federalism, and direct democracy—has fallen prey to emergency creep.
During World War I, the Federal Assembly transferred unlimited authority to the Federal Council through a Vollmachtenbeschluss (full powers decree) on August 3, 1914, enabling the executive to take “all measures necessary” for national security.
The war ended in 1918. The emergency powers lingered.
When World War II arrived, Switzerland again implemented full powers governance—the Vollmachtenregime—which lasted from 1939 until 1952. That’s right: it took a popular vote to force the Swiss executive to relinquish emergency powers seven years after the war ended.
If Switzerland—with its constitutional tradition, direct democracy, and multi-century culture of restraint—struggles to end emergencies, what hope do the rest of us have?
The Asymmetry Problem
The core issue is mathematical asymmetry. Under most emergency frameworks:
- Extending emergency powers requires: Executive signs renewal, cites ongoing threat, done.
- Terminating emergency powers requires: Affirmative legislative action, often against executive opposition, in an atmosphere where “ending vigilance” looks soft.
This asymmetry produces predictable results. The executive gains power through emergency declaration. Returning that power requires voluntary sacrifice of advantage. Human nature rarely cooperates.
The United States provides a vivid case study. The National Emergencies Act of 1976 was designed to restore checks and balances after decades of open-ended emergency declarations. When passed, four national emergencies dating back as far as 1933 remained in effect. Congress included three safeguards:
- Emergency declarations would automatically expire after one year unless the President renewed them
- Congress could terminate declarations through a “legislative veto”
- Congress would meet every six months during emergencies to consider termination
All three safeguards proved impotent. Renewing declarations requires only the President’s signature. The Supreme Court struck down legislative vetoes as unconstitutional in 1983. And the six-month review meetings became perfunctory exercises in rubber-stamping. As of 2024, dozens of national emergencies remain active—some decades old.
The problem isn’t that Americans don’t care about democracy. The problem is that the default favors continuation. And in politics, defaults are destiny.
Designing for Discontinuity
Time limits alone are insufficient. France’s emergency had time limits—and was extended five times. The solution isn’t better intentions. It’s better math.
The Cooling Period Innovation
A cooling period introduces mandatory discontinuity between emergency periods. Rather than allowing indefinite consecutive renewals, the system requires a gap—a period during which emergency powers are not in effect—before they can be reinvoked.
The proposed structure:
- Maximum emergency duration: 90 days
- Mandatory cooling period: 30 days
- After cooling period: Emergency can be redeclared if conditions warrant
This changes the political calculus fundamentally:
Without cooling period: “Shall we extend the current emergency?”
The answer is almost always yes. No politician wants to be blamed if something goes wrong after “relaxing vigilance.” The emergency apparatus itself lobbies for continuation. Extension is framed as mere continuation of current policy, not a new decision.
With cooling period: “Shall we return to emergency status after experiencing normal governance?”
The answer now requires active justification. Society has experienced governance without emergency powers, generating evidence about whether they’re actually necessary. Institutions have recovered their normal functioning. Public attention is focused on the explicit ending and potential restarting—a visible event, not quiet administrative extension.
Why 90 Days?
Analysis of successful emergency frameworks suggests an optimal initial duration of approximately 90 days (roughly three months).
This duration is long enough to:
- Mount a meaningful response to genuine crisis
- Gather information about the actual nature and scope of the threat
- Develop non-emergency legal frameworks if needed
But short enough to:
- Require early deliberation about continuation
- Prevent normalization of emergency measures
- Maintain public and legislative attention on the exception
The key is that 90 days forces an early decision point. If the emergency is genuine and ongoing, renewal requires making the case during a period when attention remains focused. If the emergency has passed or never truly justified the response, the default returns to normal governance without requiring anyone to actively dismantle accumulated power.
Why 30 Days?
The cooling period serves multiple functions:
Information Gathering: Society experiences governance without emergency powers, generating evidence about whether they’re actually necessary. If nothing bad happens during the cooling period, maybe the emergency wasn’t so emergent after all.
Institutional Recovery: Legislative oversight, judicial review, and civil society checks recover their normal functioning, enabling genuine assessment rather than rubber-stamping under pressure.
Public Attention: The explicit ending and potential restarting of emergency becomes a visible public event, subject to democratic deliberation rather than quiet administrative extension.
Political Courage: Leaders who believe emergency powers should not return have a natural moment to make that case, rather than opposing “mere extension.”
The Mathematics
The 90/30 structure creates specific constraints:
- Maximum emergency time in any 120-day period: 90 days (75%)
- Maximum emergency time in any year: Approximately 274 days (75%)
- Number of forced deliberation events per year of ongoing crisis: At least 3
Compare this to systems without cooling periods:
- Maximum emergency time: 365 days (100%)
- Number of deliberation events: 0 (if renewals are automatic) or 12 (if monthly, but without discontinuity forcing genuine reconsideration)
The cooling period also prevents what might be called “emergency arbitrage”—declaring a new emergency immediately after the previous one expires to circumvent time limits. Any redeclaration must survive the 30-day test of governance without emergency powers.
The Roman Precedent (and Its Failure)
Ancient Rome offers both precedent and warning.
The Roman dictatorship was one of history’s most elegant emergency solutions. A dictator held absolute power: he could rule by decree, command all armies, and even order executions without trial. But the office came with severe limitations:
- Six-month maximum term: A dictator’s power expired automatically, regardless of whether the crisis was resolved
- Single purpose: Dictators were appointed for specific tasks and could not exceed their mandate
- Post-term liability: After their terms, dictators faced prosecution for any abuses
The model dictator was Cincinnatus, who was summoned from his farm in 458 BCE, defeated Rome’s enemies in battle, and resigned after just 16 days—with nearly five and a half months of his term remaining—to return to his plow. He did it again in 439 BCE. For 300 years, this model generally held.
Then Sulla demonstrated that the six-month limit was merely customary, not inviolable. His unlimited dictatorship (82-79 BCE) normalized what had been unthinkable. Caesar took the next step, accepting perpetual dictatorship in 44 BCE. The Republic died because its emergency safeguards lacked what Roman constitutional culture couldn’t provide: a structural mechanism forcing discontinuity.
The Roman Republic didn’t fall because it lacked safeguards. It fell because those safeguards were designed for a small city-state and failed to adapt. More importantly, there was no cooling period between dictatorships. When Sulla created an indefinite dictatorship, and later Caesar accepted perpetual dictatorship, no structural mechanism forced a pause for reflection.
The cooling period concept addresses this gap: not just limiting duration, but requiring discontinuity.
The Swiss Model (What They Got Right)
Despite—or perhaps because of—its historical experience with emergency overreach, Switzerland has developed one of the most sophisticated frameworks for constraining crisis governance.
The Constitutional Non-Provision
Here’s the clever bit: the Swiss Constitution does not actually contain explicit provisions regulating states of emergency. Instead, emergency powers derive from general articles allowing the Federal Council to issue ordinances “to counter existing or imminent threats of serious disruption.”
This design reflects a crucial insight: the absence of explicit emergency provisions may be safer than their presence. Rather than creating a pre-authorized pathway to expanded executive power, Switzerland requires emergency actions to operate within the existing constitutional framework, with the Federal Council bound by the principle of proportionality even during crises.
No pre-built “break glass” mechanism means less temptation to break the glass.
The Six-Month Parliamentary Check
If the Federal Council adopts emergency measures, it must submit the resulting ordinances to parliament within six months. This isn’t merely a notification requirement; parliament can modify or revoke executive measures, restoring legislative supremacy over emergency policy.
The Referendum Backstop
Ordinances issued during extraordinary circumstances are not subject to mandatory referendum. This acknowledges the need for rapid response. But this exemption is narrow and temporary—the underlying emergency framework itself remains subject to direct democratic accountability through Switzerland’s famous referendum system.
The Swiss people can always override their government. This knowledge disciplines everyone’s behavior.
Implementation Blueprint
Translating the 90-day limit with 30-day cooling period from theory to practice requires addressing several key design elements.
Declaration Requirements
The temptation is vague language—“threat to national security” or “public emergency”—which enables expansive interpretation. More robust frameworks require specific criteria. India’s post-1978 constitutional amendment specifically replaced “internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion” as grounds for emergency—raising the threshold for invocation after Indira Gandhi’s abusive Emergency of 1975-1977.
A robust declaration should require:
- Identification of specific, concrete, and immediate threat
- Explanation of why existing non-emergency legal frameworks are insufficient
- Definition of success criteria (what conditions would indicate the emergency has ended)
- Enumeration of specific powers being activated (not blanket authorization)
The Supermajority Threshold
If possible, declaration should require supermajority approval—not mere majority. This raises the threshold for invocation while still permitting response to genuine crisis. The Hungarian case (where the ruling party’s two-thirds majority enabled indefinite decree powers) suggests this safeguard alone is insufficient, but it adds friction.
In the Unscarcity framework, emergency declaration requires 75% Diversity Guard approval—consensus across demonstrably different Commons. This makes capture structurally difficult while still allowing response to genuine threats.
During the Emergency: Concurrent Governance
Emergency powers should operate alongside normal governance, not replace it. Legislature continues meeting. Courts remain open. The emergency authorizes additional executive actions; it does not suspend other branches.
All actions taken under emergency authority should be reported to the legislature within 48 hours. This is not post-hoc review; it is concurrent transparency. The French experience shows that lack of real-time information enables discriminatory and disproportionate action.
The Automatic Sunset
When the 90-day limit is reached, the cooling period activates automatically. No legislative vote required. No executive proclamation. The emergency simply ends, and the 30-day cooling period begins.
This is the crucial innovation. The system doesn’t trust anyone to voluntarily surrender power. It removes the choice.
Redeclaration After Cooling
After the cooling period expires, redeclaration is possible but must satisfy:
- New declaration process (same requirements as original)
- Review of previous emergency period (what was done, was it effective, was it proportionate)
- Explanation of why normal governance proved insufficient during cooling period
- Renewed specification of success criteria
The burden shifts from “why should we end this?” to “why should we start again?”
Objections and Responses
“What about genuine ongoing emergencies?”
The system allows redeclaration after the cooling period. If the threat is genuine, the case for redeclaration will be strong. The cooling period tests whether the emergency is real or has become administrative convenience.
“Enemies will exploit the cooling period!”
Adversaries already know democratic societies have constraints. The predictability of 90/30 timing is less dangerous than the unpredictability of autocratic drift. Moreover, many emergency powers become security theater rather than genuine protection—the cooling period tests which measures actually matter.
“90 days is too short for complex emergencies!”
The limit is on extraordinary powers, not on government response. Normal legal frameworks can address most situations. If 90 days proves genuinely insufficient, the redeclaration mechanism exists—but with deliberation, not automaticity.
“30-day cooling is too long!”
The duration can be calibrated, but it must be long enough to allow institutional recovery, enable genuine deliberation, and generate evidence of governance without emergency powers. Less than two weeks is likely insufficient; more than two months may be unnecessarily restrictive. The 30-day figure represents a reasonable balance.
The Axiomatic Hierarchy: Why Some Rules Can’t Break
The Unscarcity framework goes further than any historical precedent by embedding emergency constraints at the constitutional level through the Axiomatic Hierarchy.
Tier 1: Foundational Principles (Unbreakable Architecture)
- Axiom II (Truth Must Be Seen): Transparency requirements cannot be suspended, even during emergencies. All actions under emergency authority remain publicly visible.
- Axiom IV (Power Must Decay): Term limits and the 90-day maximum cannot be overridden. The cooling period is constitutionally mandated, not negotiable.
Tier 2: The Guiding Axioms (Moral Purpose)
- Axiom I (Experience is Sacred): Foundation access cannot be revoked during emergencies. You can restrict movement, but you cannot starve people.
- Axiom III (Freedom is Reciprocal): Emergency powers must be proportionate to the threat.
- Axiom V (Difference Sustains Life): The Diversity Guard requirement remains in force—no one faction can declare emergency alone.
This hierarchy closes the “tyranny loophole” by making procedural safeguards architecturally unbreakable, even by supermajority vote or during emergencies. You cannot vote to suspend the sunset clause because the sunset clause exists at a constitutional level higher than voting can reach.
Conclusion: The Math of Liberty
Emergencies are real. Genuine crises require rapid, coordinated response. No serious framework for governance can ignore this reality.
But the history of democracy teaches that emergency powers pose existential danger to the constitutional order they purport to protect. From Weimar Germany’s Article 48 to Hungary’s COVID decrees, from France’s 719-day “temporary” measures to America’s indefinitely extended national emergencies, the pattern repeats: powers granted temporarily become permanent; exceptions become rules; democracies hollow out from within.
South Korea’s December 2024 martial law crisis offers a glimmer of hope. When President Yoon tried to seize power through emergency decree, democratic institutions pushed back hard enough and fast enough to stop him. But South Korea got lucky. The military hesitated. The legislature was nearby. The coup was poorly planned. We cannot design governance systems that depend on luck.
The 90-day limit with 30-day cooling period represents an attempt to break the pattern through mathematical constraints rather than political will. By forcing discontinuity—requiring society to experience normal governance before redeclaring emergency status—the framework creates structural resistance to emergency normalization.
This is not a perfect solution. No constitutional mechanism can fully compensate for a society determined to abandon its principles. Constitutional collapse often arises not merely from the existence of formal emergency powers, but from an executive willing to exploit them without regard for custom and compromise.
But institutional design matters. The Roman Republic survived centuries with its limited-term dictatorship; it fell when those limits were breached. Switzerland’s direct democracy forced relinquishment of wartime powers that the executive would never have voluntarily surrendered. South Korea’s strong institutions rejected a coup in real-time. Structural constraints buy time for democratic accountability to function.
The Unscarcity framework proposes a civilization designed for permanence—for multi-generational thriving rather than short-term optimization. Such a civilization requires governance structures that can survive their own emergencies. The 90-day limit with 30-day cooling period offers one such structure: emergency powers that remain genuinely temporary because the system makes permanence mathematically difficult.
Because when you design a system to last a thousand years, you need to assume someone will eventually try to break it. The question is whether the architecture makes breaking it harder than following the rules.
References
- 2024 South Korean martial law crisis - Wikipedia
- How the 2015 Paris attacks increased police powers and eroded civil liberties - France24
- State of the world 2024: 25 years of autocratization - V-Dem analysis
- The State of Emergency in France: Days Without End? - European Constitutional Law Review
- France’s Permanent State of Emergency - Amnesty International
- France’s Counterterrorism Bill Normalizes Emergency Practices - Human Rights Watch
- Concentration of Powers in the Federal Executive: Switzerland - Verfassungsblog
- Regulatory Uncertainty Over Emergency Powers in Switzerland - The Regulatory Review
- Venice Commission: Observatory on Emergency Situations - Switzerland
- Emergency Powers | Brennan Center for Justice
- Pandemic Backsliding: Violations of Democratic Standards During COVID-19 - PMC
- Autocratization by Decree: States of Emergency and Democratic Decline - Comparative Politics
- Emergency Powers Primer - International IDEA
- Sunset Clauses: Don’t Let the Sun Go Down on Democracy - Westminster Foundation for Democracy
- Emergency Powers and the COVID-19 Pandemic - IFES
- Roman dictator - Wikipedia
- Cincinnatus - Wikipedia
This article supports Chapter 3 of the Unscarcity manuscript, which examines the MOSAIC governance system and emergency protocol design.
